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Abstract
In the pre-World-War I period, lacking regulatory restrictions allowed ‘hidden’ mergers;
however, some companies disclosed information voluntarily. I analyze insider gains by
investigating the share price behavior prior to merger announcements. When companies hid
information, stocks exhibited positive abnormal returns prior to newspaper reports that
uncovered hidden transactions.
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1. Introduction 
To observe whether companies voluntarily disclose mergers or hide information, one has to 
go far back in history, when neither moral pressure nor legal consequences prevented 
managers and principal shareholders from abusing their insider information. The pre-1914 
period in Germany did not exhibit tight regulation concerning the disclosure of mergers; 
hence, this period is an appropriate choice for historical ‘experiments’. Tilly (1982) found 
high merger activity in 1908; hence, I chose this year for my analysis. Acquirers were able to 
postpone official merger announcements, which gave them the opportunity to purchase stocks 
of target firms cheaper on the stock exchange than by an official public offer. Yet, companies 
were not able to hide their objectives perfectly, because newspapers spread rumors about 
imminent mergers.  
Keown and Pinkerton (1981) used pre-announcement adjustments of share prices to 
uncover insider activities triggered by mergers in 1975-1978. Only Banerjee and Eckhard 
(2001) provided evidence for insider trading in a historical period, namely 1896-1903. Both 
studies focused on the US. Germany is due to the late introduction of rules against insider 
trading and its corporate governance structure an interesting case. Fohlin (2005) stressed the 
high level of concentration of ownership and control due to family dynasties, cross-ownership 
among companies, and relationship banking (bank involved in ownership and control of non-
financial corporations). Separation of ownership and control was not predominant, as 
managers were often principal shareholders. Members of supervisory boards had a 
considerable stake in the company; thereby, free rider problems did not prevent effective 
control of the management. Majority shareholders and integration among firms through cross-
shareholding and communities of interest facilitated controlling managers. 
My study has a crucial empirical advantage compared to Banerjee and Eckhard (2001) 
in that I collected daily instead of weekly data. Morse (1984) pointed out that the lower the 
frequency of data the more cross-sectional units are needed to maintain a high power of event-
studies. Therefore, collecting daily returns for my historical sample is a considerable 
improvement compared to former research.  
My paper is organizing as follows. Section two addresses the legislative framework in 
Germany in the pre-1914 period. The method of sampling is presented followed by a 
discussion of my empirical findings. Finally, concluding remarks stress policy 
recommendations that can be derived from my results. 
 
2. Regulatory framework 
The exchange law (Börsengesetz) of 1896 provided the legal framework for the period from 
1896 to 1914. The term insider did not exist at that time – but contemporary reports of the 
committee (BEK)1 that discussed the exchange law pointed out that there was a fear of 
unregulated speculation that could destabilize exchanges. This fear was caused by the 
experiences of the crisis in 1873 (Gruenderkrise). An increase in speculation – among other 
factors – was made responsible for the pronounced decline in asset prices. Contemporaries 
used the term speculation or speculator in a different way compared to the recent finance 
literature. Every transaction motivated by an expected future increase in the market value of 
the respective company was seen as speculation. Noteworthy, the BEK distinguished between 
two forms of speculation, namely justified and unjustified speculation. A speculation was 
unjustified if speculators acted like gamblers and did not base their investment decision on the 
evaluation of the company’s real economic situation.2 Furthermore, the BEK thought that 
speculators were responsible for the deviation of stock prices from their justified fundamental 
values. This excessive over- or underestimation of fundamental values was considered as 
                                            
1
 See Weber (2000) for a precise discussion of the reports provided by the Börsen Enquete Kommission (BEK). 
2
 Even contemporary economists like Bachmann (1898) had problems to precisely distinguish between justified 
and unjustified speculation. 
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main source of additional risk and, hence, higher stock price volatility.3 To reduce the 
influence of speculation on stock prices, the exchange law restricted forward dealings, as 
these financial instruments were seen as a device mostly used by speculators.4 Since the 
introduction of the exchange law in 1896 and the complete cessation of option dealing in 
1914, the futures market regained its former importance in terms of liquidity and trading 
volume not before the 1970s. The focus of the exchange law in 1896 was on forward dealings 
and not on prohibiting insider trading by forcing companies to disclose price-sensitive 
information.  
 
3. Data 
To evaluate the impact of official merger announcements and the publication of rumors about 
hidden mergers, I read the daily newspaper “Berliner Börsenzeitung” in 1908. The “Berliner 
Börsenzeitung” was the leading newspaper for investors; thus, one can regard mergers 
released by the “Berliner Börsenzeitung” as public information. In 1908, 101 mergers were 
discussed in the newspaper out of which 46 were included in my sample, as not all companies 
were listed on stock exchanges. Moreover, 13 firms out of 46 decided to hide an imminent 
merger. To obtain an impression about the strength of my data set, one can refer to Banerjee 
and Eckhard (2001) that collected 56 mergers out of which 19 were not disclosed. They 
collected weekly information about mergers and share prices.5 In contrast, I used daily returns 
and determined the exact day on which the newspaper revealed mergers. In my sample, banks 
were responsible for 43.1% of all mergers followed by manufacturing (36.7%), the 
transportation industry (10.1%), and raw material production (10.1%). Besides collecting 
information on newspaper articles, my sample contains daily share price. To assess whether 
stock returns around merger announcements deviated from the normal stock price 
movements, I collected 50 daily share prices of every stock twelve months prior to the 
merger; thus, these share prices were not affected by announcements.  
 
4. Results 
Based on event study methods (see Masulis, 1980; Armitage, 1995), I derive abnormal returns 
for the event period that starts 15 days before the announcement and ends 15 days afterwards. 
As a market index did not exist in the pre-1914 period, I use a constant-mean-return model. 
Figure 1 plots cumulated abnormal returns of the portfolio of hidden and disclosed mergers in 
1908. Stock prices of firms that hide information exhibited a remarkable increase over the 
whole period of 31 days by 5.60% (p-value 0.000), whereas the market values of firms that 
disclosed mergers increased only by 1.63% (p-value 0.027). To assess the extent of insider 
gains, I analyze the cumulated abnormal returns prior to announcements (t=1,2,…,15). Table 
1 contains these run-ups for hidden and disclosed mergers. If the merger is officially 
disclosed, the cumulated abnormal return prior to the event day adds up to 0.73% (p-value 
0.152) and is insignificant. On the event day, the average market value increases by 0.40% (p-
value 0.032); thus, the announced merger has a strong impact on stock prices. After the 
disclosure, the adaptation process of stock prices is not yet completed, and the cumulated 
significant effect reaches 0.89% (p-value 0.091). In contrast, hiding information negatively 
affected small shareholders (outsiders) because a pronounced increase in stock prices by 
4.79% (p-value 0.000) occurred before the merger became public information. After outsiders 
update their information by reading about rumors in the newspaper, further profits were 
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 If the exchange law of 1896 really influenced the observable excess volatility is still debating (see, for instance, 
Wetzel, 1996). 
4
 See exchange law (BörsG) §§48-69. Falke (1979) pointed out that the law of the year 1896 was focused mainly 
on forward dealings regarding grain and flour. He also stressed the new publication requirements if a firm went 
public or issued additional shares. 
5
 They relied on information provided by the weekly newspaper “The Commercial and Financial Chronicle”. 
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hardly possible. Consider that the event day had nearly no impact on market values; the 
abnormal return was very close to zero. Moreover, a considerable part of 85.49% of the whole 
price impact of a merger was already reflected in the market prices before mergers were 
released.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Hiding information negatively affected small shareholders, as share prices before the event 
day reflected more than 85% of the total change in market value due to mergers. Nevertheless, 
the majority of the companies decided to release price-sensitive information. A possible 
advantage of voluntary disclosure is that companies could improve their reputation and could 
stay trustworthy for small shareholders. This was relevant if acquiring companies had to 
finance their expansion by issuing new shares. Noteworthy, issuing new shares financed 
44.3% of all mergers. Despite the observed voluntary disclosure in the pre-1914 period, one 
could argue that small shareholders suffered when companies hid information. If a social 
planner wants to avoid that efficiency gains from mergers are distributed to insiders 
(managers and majority shareholders) and not to minority shareholders, imposing regulations 
that force companies to release information can be justified.  
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Table 1. Measuring the run-ups for different types of disclosure 
Note that p-values are set in parentheses. 
 Revelation of information Hidden information 
Pre-announcement gains 
t∈{1,2,…15} 
0.7335 (0.152) 4.7875 (0.000) 
Gains on the event day 
t=16 
0.4037 (0.032) -0.0079 (0.952) 
After-announcement gains 
t∈{16,17,…31} 
0.8940 (0.091) 0.8128 (0.125) 
Total change in market value 
over the 31 days 
1.6275 (0.027) 5.6002 (0.000) 
Pre-announcement gains in 
per cent of total change 
45.07% 85.49% 
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Figure 1. Cumulated abnormal return of firms that disclose or hide information  
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This figure plots the aggregated cumulated abnormal return. Grey lines indicate the 95% 
confidence interval. 
 
